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ABSTRACT
Anomalous events that aﬀect the performance of networks
are a fact of life. It is therefore not surprising that recent
years have seen an explosion in research on network anomaly
detection. What is quite surprising, however, is the lack of
controlled evaluation of these detectors. In this paper we
argue that there are numerous important questions regard-
ing the eﬀectiveness of anomaly detectors that cannot be
answered by the evaluation techniques employed today. We
present four central requirements of a rigorous evaluation
that can only be met by simulating both the anomaly and
its surrounding environment. While simulation is necessary,
it is not suﬃcient. We therefore present an outline of an
evaluation methodology that leverages both simulation and
traces from operational networks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Op-
erations; C.4 [Performance of Systems]:
General Terms
Experimentation, Performance, Measurement
1. INTRODUCTION
Automated detection of anomalies in computer networks
has been a hot topic for several years. Approaches have
been presented [2, 8, 6] to detect anomalies such as worms,
DDoS attacks, and IP scans. Despite this ﬂurry of anomaly-
detection papers, eﬀective ways to validate and compare the
proposed solutions have remained elusive. This is particu-
larly important for statistical techniques, where one typ-
ically aims to detect variations from “normal” behavior,
rather than a speciﬁc signature (as is sometimes the case
in the security arena). In this paper we argue that exist-
ing evaluation techniques are unable to answer numerous
important questions regarding the eﬀectiveness of anomaly
detectors; only by simulating both the anomalies and the
environment within which they occur will we be able to do
so.
In order to quantify the accuracy of a detector it is neces-
sary to ﬁrst identify a set of “true” anomalies that ought to
be found by the detector. This set must obviously be identi-
ﬁed by a procedure that is independent of the detector being
evaluated. By far the most common way to accomplish this
identiﬁcation is to rely on manual labeling of traces by do-
main experts [1, 8, 11, 5]. In this procedure, the human
domain expert inspects a trace and certiﬁes some events as
being true-positive anomalies. The detector is then evalu-
ated based on its ability to identify this set of events. Man-
ual labeling is a natural ﬁrst evaluation technique in a new
ﬁeld because it builds expertise with a new source of data
and this knowledge of the properties of anomalies is essential
in order to later automate detection.
Network anomaly detection is now a more mature ﬁeld,
however, with more related publications than we have space
to enumerate. Unfortunately, existing evaluation techniques
do not allow us to adequately compare the relative strengths
of detection algorithms. Manual labeling, for example, is an
insuﬃcient evaluation methodology for many reasons: (1) it
may be impossible to share the underlying traces (e.g., due
to proprietary data or privacy concerns), (2) even domain
experts are ﬂawed and may miss true anomalies, (3) manual
processes do not scale to the magnitude necessary to identify
rare but important anomalies, and (4) the reliance on a ﬁxed
trace prevents us from performing sensitivity analysis, for
example to determine how “large” an anomaly must be for
it to be detected. The central argument of this paper is that
anomaly detection research should improve the standard of
rigor in future publications, and we identify simulation as a
way this can be achieved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we enumerate some high-level requirements of a thor-
ough evaluation of anomaly detectors that are not always
met by currently employed evaluation methodologies. In
Section 3 we show that simulation can satisfy each of these
requirements. This fact notwithstanding, simulation is not
suﬃcient in and of itself, and thus we present an outline of
a complete evaluation methodology and the roles that both
simulation and real traces have to play. We conclude in
Section 4.
2. REQUIREMENTS
In this section we will enumerate four requirements of a
complete evaluation methodology for anomaly detectors.
2.1 Ground Truth
“Ground truth” in the context of network anomaly detec-
tion requires a complete list of all anomalies that exist in
a given data set. While the requirement itself might seems
obvious, it is much less clear how to obtain this ground truth.
Identifying the true-positive anomalies requires combing through
vast amounts of data that are sometimes of poor quality
due to data-reduction techniques such as sampling. In ad-
dition, the anomalies themselves are a moving target (e.g.,
new worms are discovered on a regular basis), and often hard
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challenges of obtaining high-quality data have led to many
compromises in the evaluation of anomaly detectors, which
in turn leads to “partial” ground truth.
However, there are important problems with partial ground
truth. Given only a partial list of anomalies, it is impossible
to calculate an accurate False-Negative Probability (FNP)
because without a complete list of anomalies we cannot
know the number of missed detections. Similarly, we can-
not accurately quantify the False-Positive Probability (FPP)
with only partial ground truth. Without a complete list of
anomalies, it is impossible to distinguish between a false
alarm (i.e., a false-positive) and an anomaly that your par-
tial list didn’t capture.
Moreover, it is important to realize that the FPP and FNP
are mutually dependent, i.e., providing either one without
the other is meaningless even when they are calculated from
a complete list of anomalies. The reason for this is that
most detection methods allow a tradeoﬀ between the FNP
and FPP over the complete range [0,1]. Reporting that an
algorithm has a false-negative probability of 10% is therefore
meaningless without a corresponding false-positive probabil-
ity. For example, it is trivial to construct an algorithm that
does not miss a single true anomaly (i.e., has a false-negative
probability of 0%) by asserting everything to be anomalous.
Clearly this would be a poor algorithm since it would pro-
duce unbearably many false alarms.
Even providing both the FNP and FPP from a complete
list of anomalies is insuﬃcient for a thorough comparison of
two anomaly detection systems. The reason for this is that
a pair of (FNP, FPP) measurements represent only a single
point on a curve that captures the complete tradeoﬀ between
the two performance metrics. The curve is sometimes called
the Receiver Operating Characteristic, or ROC curve, and
it and its derivatives have long been preferred in many other
ﬁelds [4]. Figure 1 demonstrates the arbitrariness of com-
paring detectors using a single point along the ROC curve
(and its associated FPP and FNP
1). The fact that the two
ROC curves intersect means that neither algorithm is ab-
solutely superior to the other; the choice between the two
algorithms depends on one’s preferred tradeoﬀ between false
alarms and missed detections.
In addition to requiring a complete list of all anomalies,
ground truth also requires detailed information about each
anomaly, viz. its location (both spatial and temporal), mag-
nitude, and type. Location information allows one to evalu-
ate whether a detector is able to properly diagnose anomalies
that might appear to be separate but are in fact correlated,
such as DDoS attacks. The time and duration of an anomaly
is necessary in order to calculate the detection delay. It is
also important to consider the magnitude of an event: ﬁrstly,
because it may be that larger events are more important to
detect. More generally, it is important to investigate the
sensitivity of a given detector to the magnitude of anoma-
lies. Finally, it is natural to assume that diﬀerent detectors
will excel at ﬁnding various types of anomalies, which means
that it is important to know the exact type or classiﬁcation
of the anomalies in a trace.
Automated injection of anomalies into traces is one tech-
nique that has been employed by some projects in order to
provide a list of authoritative anomalies [8, 15]. Anomaly
1True-Positive Probability = 1 - False-Negative Probability
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Figure 1: Example ROC curves. Signal: white
Gaussian noise with a single injected anomaly (a
rectangular pulse of random location, height, and
duration). Detection by smoothing the data using a
moving average (of two diﬀerent lengths) and then
thresholding at a range of values.
injection leverages models of anomalies in order to introduce
them into traces taken from operational networks. It cannot
guarantee accurate FPP and FNP measurements due to its
reliance on existing traces. That is, these existing traces pre-
sumably came with an unknown number of anomalies. As
we have already argued, neither automated algorithms nor
human domain experts can identify all these anomalies with
complete conﬁdence—not even network operators [1, 5]. It
will therefore be impossible for any evaluation technique
that relies on traces from operational networks to guarantee
an accurate FNP.
2.2 Reproducibility
The ability to reproduce an experiment is a central tenet
of the scientiﬁc method. A researcher might wish to (1)
verify published results by evaluating the same algorithm on
the same data, (2) investigate the robustness of a published
algorithm by applying it to diﬀerent data, or (3) compare a
novel algorithm against the published one by using the same
data.
Reproducibility is particularly important in the context
of evaluating network anomaly detectors because some of
the events we wish to detect are exceedingly rare. Also, for
a practical anomaly detection algorithm the FPP must be
very small. Consider a typical scenario: a network operator
runs an anomaly detection algorithm on each of the 1000
edge links in her network (a large network can easily have
10’s of thousands edge links), each monitored using standard
ﬁve-minute SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)
traﬃc measurements. This represents 288,000 samples per
day. If the FPP is only 10
−4, this will still result in around 28
false alarms per day. Even this number of false alarms may
be prohibitive: the observed reaction of network operators
to a system that generates too many false alarms is that
they either ignore it, or turn it oﬀ. If it takes on the order
of 20 minutes, say, to determine the truth (or otherwise)
of an alarm, then an operator could handle on the order
of 50 alarms of any sort in a day (assuming they had no
other tasks). Many alarms would take much longer than 20
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very small. Typical goals may be of the order of 10
−4,1 0
−5,
or even 10
−6. However, measuring small probabilities has
challenges, as we shall show here.
Small occurrence probabilities require that we must be
able to reproduce experiments many times over in order to
gain conﬁdence in detection performance. That is, one can-
not draw general conclusions about the FNP or FPP from
single experiments if the chance of seeing a given alarm is
exceedingly small. For example, the fact that a detector
returns the one-and-only relevant anomaly in a given trace
does not mean that it has FPP = FNP = 0%; it may simply
mean that we have not evaluated the detector on enough
data.
Consider the simple scenario where we wish to estimate
the FPP p of our “anomalous packet detector”. We there-
fore evaluate the detector on a trace with n samples (pack-
ets) that we assume to be independent. The number of false
alarms generated would therefore follow a binomial distri-
bution, i.e., the probability of k false alarms is
p(k)=
 
n
k
!
p
k(1 − p)
(n−k).
The maximum likelihood estimator for p, given a binomial
distribution is simply ˆ p = k/n,a n dE{ˆ p} = p (so the es-
timator is unbiased). There are a number of approxima-
tions one can make to the binomial distribution, a com-
mon one being a Gaussian distribution with mean np,a n d
variance np(1 − p). Gaussianity is a convenient simplifying
assumption for calculating errors: the 95th percentile conﬁ-
dence intervals for the estimate can be easily calculated to
be ±1.96
p
p(1 − p)/n. However, this approximation is only
reasonable for large n. A common rule of thumb is that
np(1 − p) > 9 is required to make the approximation rea-
sonable. Clearly, as p becomes small, the factor of (1 − p)
can be ignored, and we require n>9/p,w h i c hf o rp =1 0
−4
would require n =9 0 ,000 trials.
This inverse relationship between the number of trials and
p requires many more trials than is often performed. For
instance, it is common to examine a week of ﬁve-minute
SNMP data, which would contain 1440 trials. However, the
real number of trials one may require is even worse. Consider
that we may aim to make enough measurements to bound
the error. For instance, let us set the apparently reasonable
goal to bound the errors in ˆ p by ±10%. The relative errors
in estimates (as estimated from the conﬁdence intervals) will
be
error = 1.96
p
p(1 − p)/n/p   2/
√
np.
So we require n>4/(p × error
2). Our apparently modest
requirement that error ≤ 0.1r e s u l t si nn>400/p. Again us-
ing p =1 0
−4 this results in four million trials. Figure 2 illus-
trates the problem with a set of simulated ˆ p measurements
(for p =1 0
−4), where the number of trials n is shown on the
y-axis. The plots show histograms of the values of ˆ p over
100 simulated experiments, and we can see that for n ≤ 10
4
the resulting distribution is discrete and often provides an
inaccurate measure of p (e.g., the probability of estimating
that p = 0 is signiﬁcant). When n =1 0
5, the distribution
of values somewhat resembles a Gaussian distribution but
errors are roughly ±100%. It is not until n =1 0
6 that we
obtain a reasonably accurate measure of p.
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Figure 2: A set of simulated ˆ p measurements (for
p =1 0
−4), where the number of trials n is shown on
the y-axis. The plots show histograms of the values
of ˆ p over 100 simulated experiments.
There are many more sophisticated statistical techniques
for estimating or bounding such probability estimates (e.g.,
Neyman-Pearson tests), but these do not avoid the basic
point that many samples are needed to provide accurate
bounds on FPP estimates. Typical data sets will not have
enough data points to ﬁnd the FPP to the degree of accuracy
we require, simply because providing ground truth data (by
manual classiﬁcation) is so time consuming. On the other
hand, simulation provides virtually unlimited data sets.
The problem of reproducibility in network anomaly de-
tection is particularly dire due to a general lack of public
data sets (particularly those that have some annotation as
to ground truth). While some researchers have made com-
mendable eﬀorts to share both their software and evaluation
traces (e.g., Lakhina et al.), most have not. The problem
is exacerbated because most detectors are evaluated using
traces from operational networks, and there are numerous
valid reasons why such traces cannot be shared with the
community. A signiﬁcant fraction of these traces come from
commercial networks, which means that both the data and
software is likely proprietary. Even for traces from educa-
tional networks, there will be privacy concerns. Further-
more, there are stringent laws that restrict the distribution
of certain types of telecommunications data. Finally, traces
can often be on the order of many terabytes and it may be
practically infeasible to share them. Traces can grow to this
size because modern networks carry vast amounts of traf-
ﬁc and therefore any algorithm that is claimed to be able
to operate in an online setting should be evaluated on rep-
resentative traces. Simulation avoids this issue by sharing
code to generate the large sample sets required.
2.3 Anomaly Deﬁnitions
Network anomaly detectors can be split into two groups:
(1) those that aim to ﬁnd very speciﬁc anomalies such as
worms or DDoS attacks [18, 13], and (2) those detectors
that aim more broadly to to ﬁnd all anomalies that devi-
ate from what is expected or “normal”. Examples of the
latter category include detectors that deﬁne anomalies as
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a statistical model of expected traﬃc behavior [1, 8, 15].
The tension between the above two classes is inherent
to network anomaly detection. That is, on the one hand,
anomalies themselves are a moving target because funda-
mentally new attacks are sometimes discovered and old at-
tacks mutate. One might therefore want a ﬂexible detector
that can adapt to the changing environment. On the other
hand, it would not be unexpected if a specialized detector,
e.g., focusing only on identifying DDoS attacks, were to out-
perform general-purpose detectors for their speciﬁc tasks.
While one can legitimately debate the merits of each class
of detectors, it is impossible to evaluate a detector unless
one speciﬁes what it is one is looking for. In fact, this re-
quirement is a precondition for both ground truth and re-
producibility. That is, an evaluation needs a speciﬁcation
of what ought to be found in order to be reproducible or
otherwise one will not be able to perform the same evalua-
tion using other traces. Likewise, ground truth requires that
one ﬁnd all the anomalies that exist in a given trace, which
also implies that we need a description of what constitutes
a bona ﬁde anomaly.
2.4 Experimental Control
There are important questions about the eﬀectiveness of
network anomaly detectors that cannot be answered with-
out having complete control of the entire evaluation exper-
iment. Having complete control requires that one has the
power to change the location, magnitude, and type of indi-
vidual anomalies as well as for the background traﬃc. Sam-
ple questions that require this type of control include:
• How many destination IP addresses must be targeted
before a host scan is identiﬁed by the detector?
• If the detector requires training in order to build a
model of normal network behavior, what is the impact
of anomalies occurring during this training period?
• What would be the impact on a detector’s FNP if IP
ﬂows were sampled at a rate of 1-in-100 instead of 1-in-
1000?
• Can an adversary evade detection if she knows the thresh-
olds/parameters used by the algorithm?
Each of these are important questions, and they all re-
quire control over the experiment. Manual labeling would
be unable to provide such control due to the ﬁxed nature
of the underlying trace. The only previously employed eval-
uation methodology that provides some measure of control
is automated anomaly injection into existing traces. For
anomaly injection the control extends only to the anomaly
itself, however; not the background traﬃc, which is static
and included in the existing trace. This restricted control
precludes study of the side-eﬀects of an anomaly, such as the
delay or congestion it causes. Anomalies do not occur in a
vacuum, and it is therefore essential to capture and study
these interactions between anomalies and the background
traﬃc.
Complete control over the evaluation experiment is also
necessary in order to train and test the detector on clean
data. That is, an evaluation methodology that leverages
existing traces cannot guarantee that all anomalies in those
traces have been identiﬁed. This can obscure the true perfor-
mance of an anomaly detection algorithm both because the
algorithm trains on unclean data (which can degrade its per-
formance [11]) and because it is evaluated on unclean data.
Only through simulation can one ensure that all anomalies
in an evaluation trace are known.
3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In this section we will describe what we mean by simula-
tion, and how it satisﬁes the requirements laid out earlier.
In fact it is the only approach we are aware of that satisﬁes
all of these requirements. However, although necessary, sim-
ulation is not suﬃcient for rigorous assessment of anomaly
detection.
3.1 Simulation
Simulation has played a vital role in networking research
over the years. Unmitigated access and control over real net-
works is presently only a dream for networking researchers,
which is why simulation is necessary in order to evaluate
some aspects of complex ideas. Simulation environments in
networking are typically event based, i.e., they model dis-
crete events such as the arrival and departure of packets.
Some anomaly detection algorithms may require us to per-
form this level of simulation. For instance, consider the
case of trying to detect traﬃc spikes by measuring RTTs
(round-trip times): networks buﬀer packets during conges-
tion, which cause RTTs to increase. A simulation environ-
ment for this type of detector would need to account for
packet dynamics.
On the other hand, many anomaly detectors analyze ag-
gregated measurements, such as SNMP traﬃc data collected
at ﬁve-minute intervals, or NetFlow records. In this case, it
may be simpler, faster, and even more accurate
2 to simu-
late the aggregates directly. It is certainly true that simpler
simulation environments provide for more straightforward
causality determinations. That is, the diagnosis required to
ﬁnd the cause of some set of observations is certainly made
easier if the simulation environment has fewer parameters
and more intuitive output.
There are two parts to simulation in this context: (1) sim-
ulation of that which is “normal” (e.g., background traﬃc)
(2) simulation of an anomaly (e.g., a port scan). In general
we do not know how to do either, but in speciﬁc cases we
have very good ideas. For instance, measurements have now
shown that fractional-Gaussian Noise (fGN) is a reasonable
model for highly-aggregated backbone traﬃc. Several stud-
ies (e.g., see [12, 9]) have considered the important param-
eters of such traﬃc (the mean and how it varies over time,
variance, and Hurst parameter). Likewise, there are speciﬁc
instances where the idea of an anomaly is well deﬁned (e.g.,
traﬃc spikes resulting from DoS attacks).
One of the primary advantages of using simulation for
evaluation is the ability to perform multi-factor experiments
across several dimensions. One can perform sensitivity anal-
ysis on a detector in terms of anomaly size, data-reduction
techniques, burstiness of background traﬃc, etc. The com-
plete control that simulation oﬀers also allows one to inves-
tigate the impact of change to the data collection infras-
tructure. Evaluating the impact of fundamental changes to
sampling, ﬁltering, or data aggregation on network anomaly
detection is only presently possible through simulation.
2Higher aggregates of traﬃc often display simpler (to model)
characteristics, and as such it is easier to generate these
directly than by creating many inaccurate sub-models.
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known challenges in simulation [3]. For the purposes of eval-
uating network anomaly detectors, however, it is important
to realize that we often need to simulate only a relatively
small part of this large system. In fact, in many cases it will
not even be necessary to simulate the detector. That is to
say, the simulation environment could be leveraged exclu-
sively in order to produce high-quality (i.e., ground truth)
measurement data/traces, which are subsequently fed to the
detector for evaluation. The research community will obvi-
ously need to play a central role, both by designing and
sharing simulators for speciﬁc domains and purposes, and
in sharing the traces that are produced [14, 10].
3.2 Hypothetical Evaluation
Admittedly, simulation is not the cure-all answer to the
problem of reliably and completely evaluating network anomaly
detectors—it is necessary but not suﬃcient. Simulation pro-
vides a method to test an algorithm, but not to truly vali-
date it. For instance, a simulation may show that a certain
type of anomaly can be detected with 0 false positives or
negatives. However, if that type of anomaly never occurs in
real data, the algorithm cannot be considered to be useful.
We propose the following framework:
1. Problem formulation. We start by formulating the sce-
nario we wish to consider (e.g., detecting traﬃc spikes
in backbone traﬃc). We need an idea of the characteris-
tics of both normal and anomalous traﬃc in order to (i)
simulate these and (ii) choose an appropriate anomaly
detection scheme.
2. Training. Simulation is used to train the anomaly de-
tection algorithms to be tested or compared. Optimiz-
ing an algorithm’s parameters requires large data sets.
Simulation can provide this data.
3. Test. Simulations (independent of the ﬁrst set) are used
to test the algorithms, and understand their advantages
and limitations in detail. Simulations satisfy our re-
quirements for ground truth (as we specify this), re-
peatability, deﬁnition and control.
4. Validation. Once the characteristics of an algorithm are
understood, it can be applied to real data to understand
how it performs in a realistic setting (e.g., while process-
ing vast amounts of data or subject to network operator
requirements) [10]
This is not a closed framework. Measurements inform our
problem formulation and our simulation models. Without
such an iterative approach, anomalies pollute the data, which
both prevents the construction of accurate tests and can
profoundly degrade the performance of detectors that build
their models of “normal” network operation based on his-
torical data that is presumed to be clean [11].
4. CONCLUSION
The position we take in this paper is that anomaly detec-
tion research should improve its standard of rigor in future
publications. We have presented four central requirements
of an evaluation methodology that can only be met by sim-
ulating both the anomalies themselves and the background
traﬃc. While simulation is a necessary evaluation technique,
it is not suﬃcient. We have therefore presented an outline
of a complete evaluation methodology that speciﬁes the role
that both simulation and traces from operational networks
has to play. We believe the details of how this simulation
should be performed in speciﬁc contexts is an important area
of future research.
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